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Abstract—Random Number Generator (RNG) plays an es-
sential role in many sensor network systems and applications,
such as security and robust communication. We have developed
the ﬁrst digital hardware random number generator (DHRNG).
DHRNG has a small footprint and requires ultra-low energy.
It uses a new recursive structure that directly targets efﬁcient
FPGA implementation. The core idea is to place or extract
random values in FPGA conﬁguration bits and randomly connect
the building blocks. We present our architecture, introduce
accompanying protocols for secure public key communication,
and adopt the NIST randomness test on the DHRNG’s output
stream.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of RNGs in sensor networks has a long history
and results in signiﬁcant variety of techniques, e.g., security,
privacy and remote trust. Speciﬁcally, distributed sensing
raises the importance of sensor security to an even higher level
[1][2][3][4][5]. It is important for the sensor user to verify
that the remotely received data is actually from the trusted
sensors in the distributed system. Meanwhile, RNGs enable
public key communication and other cryptographic protocols
in sensor networks due to its intrinsic randomness.
Classical (algorithmic) RNGs have been widely used. How-
ever, they are not well suited for the sensor networks. They
are relatively slow, require high energy, and large hardware
footprints. They are also susceptible to side channel and
physical attacks [6][7].
A number of hardware random number generators (HRNGs)
are proposed in [8] to mitigate the above the problems. All of
them employ analog mechanisms that cannot be controlled or
reduplicated, such as with the use of physically unclonable
functions (PUFs) in conjunction with Von Neumann data post
processing as random number generator was done by a group
in MIT [9]. However, traditional analog mechanisms are also
high energy consuming and pose high implementation require-
ments in terms of measurement accuracy and environmental
stability.
In this paper, we propose the DHRNGs on the platform
of FPGA that inherit the general advantage of HRNGs,
but employ a completely digital system, which is extremely
lightweight and resilient to environmental conditions [10][11].
Furthermore, two variants of DHRNGs are discussed, which
respectively targets different applications. The ﬁrst variant tar-
gets easy replication, which enables creation of synchronized
RNGs that produce identical streams, therefore, can be used
for encryption/decryption and robust public key communica-
tion. The second variant employs random values after power-
up of the circuit which makes each DHRNG to be unique and
unclonable. The essence of the DHRNG variant II is that it is
a new type of SRAM PUF that can be applied to all the classic
HRNG applications because of the difﬁculty to reproduce or
simulate the new RNG. Both variants have the same hardware
architecture with only small modiﬁcations to the fabrication
procedure.
II. RELATED WORK
We now brieﬂy survey the most directly related literature on
physical unclonable functions and hardware random number
generators.
A. PUF
Papu et al. demonstrated the ﬁrst active physical unclonable
function using optical mesoscopic systems in 2001 [12].
Devadas and members of his research group observed that
intrinsic deep submicron process variation in silicon is an ideal
practical and economical starting point to fabricate a large
amount of PUFs [13][14].
More recently, many types of PUFs [15][16][17][18] are
proposed and several research groups have demonstrated
SRAM-based PUFs [19]. The key idea is that each SRAM cell
has a high probability that it is initialized to some value, either
0 or 1, after each power-up. Although the “stability ” of the
SRAM PUF cells has always been a problem, recently, it has
been experimentally demonstrated that the use of device aging
[20][21][22], speciﬁcally hot carrier injection (HCI) [23][24],
can completely eliminate this problem.
B. RNG
Pseudo number generation and its evaluation have a long
history and have resulted in a signiﬁcant variety of techniques
and tools. However, they are rarely adopted in compact general
purpose processors and FPGA implementations since they
usually use 32 or 64 bit numbers as their variables. A list of
FPGA random number generators are also proposed [25]. All
of them employ analog mechanisms that cannot be controlled.
Exactly the same situation exists with other hardware-based
random generators [26], therefore, none of them are suitable to
be applied in sensor networks. The use of PUFs in conjunction
with standard pseudorandom generators and von Neuman data
post-processing was analyzed by Devadas group [9].III. ARCHITECTURE
We now present the micro-architecture of DHRNG. The ba-
sic idea is to use randomly connected lookup tables(LUTs) to
generate the combinational logic to produce an output stream.
The DHRNG architecture shown in Figure 1 is consisted of a
LUT network of height h and width w, where h is the level
of randomly connected LUTs and w is the number of k-input
LUTs in each level. Each LUT randomly chooses its inputs
to be either output of a LUT in the previous level or its own
primary input in forming an output bit. By offering m bits
of primary inputs, w bits of ﬁnal outputs are expected. Note
that the randomness of such structure mainly comes from the
randomness of shufﬂing and the contents of each LUT, which
can be easily achieved when h and w are large enough.
We use the structure shown in Figure 1 to generate a
stream of random numbers. A stream is generated by ﬁrst
randomly choosing an m-bit input vector as the random seed,
which is then used to generate a w-bit output vector. A bit-
wise exclusive-or operation is performed between w-bit output
vector and the current input vector to produce a binary vector.
The generated binary vector would serve as the random seed
for the next round. We repeat this procedure to acquire the
output stream. We note that, although we allocate the LUTs
in such a way that each cell has the same probability to be
either 1 or 0 in each individual case, the number of 0’s and
number of 1’s may not be the same. Therefore, we further
adopt Von Neumann correction on our obtained output stream
to guarantee equal number of 0s and 1s in the ﬁnal bit stream.
IV. TWO VARIANTS
Two variants of the DHRNG are proposed in this section
which respectively targets on different applications. Both vari-
ants use exactly the same architecture as discussed in previous
section and the only difference is the way to generate the LUT
contents.
A. Variant I
As for the Variant I DHRNG, the core idea is to manually
allocate the contents of the LUTs and the connections so
that the DHRNG can be easily replicated, which enables
the creation of synchronized DHRNGs that produce identical
streams. Note that matching procedure can either be conﬁgured
by the sensor owner themselves or the trusted third party
before the DHRNGs are put into use.
Now that since both devices contain the same LUT contents
connected by the same network, they produce the same outputs
for a given set of inputs, enabling such a design to be applied
for multi-party communication. Only the party with the right-
conﬁgured DHRNG can encrypt/decrypt the messages. The
advantage of this system comes from three points. The ﬁrst
is the intrinsic randomness of each device’s output stream,
making it difﬁcult to decrypt the message statistically. The
second point is the easy replication. As long as the DHRNG
conﬁguration is known, it is very easy to conﬁgure and
reproduce the same piece of device. Therefore, multi-party
communication becomes simple which is particularly useful in
the case when a sensor owner wants to communicate with his
multiple sensors. The last point, as well as the most important
point, the device can be custom conﬁgured. Therefore, even
in the case when a malicious manufacturer or untrusted third-
party exists, the device can still be made secure.
B. Variant II
Before explaining the concept of Variant II DHRNG, it is
essential to introduce the HCI-based power-up. Hot carrier
injection (HCI) is a phenomenon in which the electron or
the hole in a transistor may be trapped in the gate oxide
when provided with high enough energy. HCI-based power-
up presents a PUF response reinforcement technique based
on HCI, which can reinforce the PUF golden response in a
short stress time without impacting the surrounding circuits.
According to a recent study, powering up a circuit for a long
enough duration (e.g., 125s) causes the content of each SRAM
cell to be randomly altered to either a stable 1 or 0 according
to its unique intrinsic ID regardless of the environmental
condition.
The Variant II DHRNG is built by applying the HCI-based
power-up on the SRAMs of LUT cells as shown in Figure
1. Two operations are required, the conﬁguration and the
power-up. Conﬁguration is the process in which we randomly
connect the LUTs on the FPGA. HCI-based power-up, which
should be adopted after conﬁguration, is used to assign the
contents of the SRAM cells, in other words, the contents of
the LUTs on the FPGA. Due to the properties of the HCI-
based power-up, the contents of the LUTs are assigned in a
completely random, unique and stable way without impacting
the surrounding circuits. After the two operations complete,
both the connection and the contents of the LUTs in the
DHRNG are set in an unpredictable way.
The conﬁguration and power-up creates a Variant II
DHRNG that enables two intrinsic properties which we can
take advantage of. First, the output stream cannot be predicted
or controlled in any way. Therefore, such a design can be
appied to generate the random seed for any secure protocols
of sensor networks. Second, the HCI-based power-up makes
our digital PUFS inherit the unclonable property of traditional
PUFs.
V. TEST RESULTS
We adopt the NIST randomness test as well as the standard
security test on our DHRNG structure in this section to
validate the output randomness.
A. NIST randomness test
The NIST randomness test [27] is a battery of standard
statistical tests to detect non-randomness in binary sequences
constructed using either random number generators or pseudo-
random number generators.
We simulate our DHRNG with height h = 20 and width
w = 64. The initial random seed is a randomly generated 64-
bit input vector (m = 64). Every LUT cell in the DHRNG
has an equal chance to be a 1 or 0. As mentioned before, we    
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Fig. 1: DHRNG architecture with input number m, width w and height h.
use the DHRNG architecture iteratively to generate the output
stream. For each single statistical test, we test for 1000 cases.
Table I shows the average passing ratio of each NIST statistical
test. We can see that the proportion of successful tests is high
enough to indicate excellent randomness in the output stream.
Statistical Test Avg. Success Ratio
Frequency 100%
Block Frequency (m=128) 99.5%
Cusum-Forward 99.2%
Cusum-Reverse 99.2%
Runs 97.2%
Longest Runs of Ones 98.1%
Rank 99.4%
Spectral DFT 98.5%
Non-overlapping Templates (m=9) 95.8%
Overlapping Templates (m=9) 97.7%
Universal 100%
Approximate Entropy (m=8) 98.1%
Random Excursions (x=+1) 98.8%
Random Excursions Variant (x=-1) 97.0%
Serial (m=16) 99.5%
Linear Complexity (M=500) 97.9%
TABLE I: NIST Statistical Test Suite average success ratio.
1000 arrays are tested for each test. Signiﬁcance Level σ =
0.01. When P-value≥σ, the array passes test.
B. Security test
While using the DHRNG to secure the sensor network,
the resistance against malicious attack/prediction is important.
In this section, we statistically analyse the security of the
DHRNG system by assuming potentially different types of
attacks. The attacks would be regarded successful if the output
stream can be predicted. The simulation is conducted on a
DHRNG architecture with height h = 20 and width w = 64.
The statistical results are based on 1,000,000 input-output
pairs.
One type of prediction is to predict outputs by the knowl-
edge of the outputs from similar inputs. This attack is dan-
gerous when the output vector with similar input vectors are
highly correlated with one another. To test this, we summarize
the hamming distance (the number of bits that are different
between two vectors) between the output vectors by changing
one bit of the input vectors at each iteration. In the ideal case,
the distribution would be in the form of a binomial distribution
Protocol 1 Public Key Communication
1: The sensor chooses a random seed as input vector I and
computes the corresponding output vector O.
2: The sensor XOR the output vector O with the message
M to be sent and gets the result R.
3: The sensor sends I and R to the sensor owner.
4: The sensor owner computes output vector O with the
received I and his/her identical DHRNG.
5: The sensor owner XOR O with the received R to get
message M.
with the peak on the half of the number of outputs. Figure 2a
shows the accumulative results of 1000 test cases, and in each
case, 1,000,000 instances of hamming distance are tested. The
binomial distribution proves that the DHRNG output stream
can not be predicted in this way.
Similar to the previously described attack, the other type
of attack attempts to predict an output bit Oi according to
the value of an input bit Ij or a corresponding output bit Oj.
In either case, if the output bit has a strong correlation with
either an input bit or another output bit, then the attacker can
deduce the output vector by knowing input bits or a subset of
the output bits. We present a conditional probability map of
P(Oi = 1|Ij = 1) in Figure 2b and P(Oi = 1|Oj = 1) in
Figure 2c depicting the low potential for prediction based on
input to output correlation and output to output correlation.
VI. PROTOCOLS
Public key communication is one of the most widely used
and fundamental protocols for secure message exchange in
sensor networks. We present how to use DHRNG to achieve
this in this section. The detailed steps of public key communi-
cation using DHRNG are enumerated in Protocol 1. Note that
both the sensor owner and the sensor are required to coordinate
their Variant I DHRNG before communication.
Since both the sensor and the sensor owner only need
very few clock cycle to encrypt/decrypt the message, the
energy overhead of this protocol is very small compared to
the traditional way of public key communication, therefore,
especially suitable for the low-power required sensor networks.0 3 6 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61
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Fig. 2: (a) The distribution of output hamming distance (the error bar shows the distribution of max, 75%, mean, 25% and
min), (b) Conditional Probabilities between Output bits Oi and input bits Ij, (c) Conditional Probabilities between Output bits
Oi and other output bits Oj.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have developed techniques for the creation of the ﬁrst
digital hardware random number generator (DHRNG) by ran-
domly assigning the contents of look-up tables on FPGAs and
connecting them to form a combinational network. In addition
to inherit the intrinsic good properties of traditional HRNGs,
the DHRNG is low-power, has small-footprint, and completely
digital, as well as being resistant to environmental variations.
DHRNG superiorly passes all standard NIST randomness
test as well as a list of statistical test, indicating excellent
randomness and resistance to a wide range of security attacks.
Finally, we have explained how to use DHRNG to achieve
public key communication in sensor networks.
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